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Abstract:  In  this  communication,  we  first  show  that  the  privacy-preserving  roaming 
protocol recently proposed for mobile networks cannot achieve the claimed security level. 
Then we suggest an improved protocol to remedy its security problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
With  the  advancement  and  tremendous  development  of  computer  networks  and 
telecommunications,  user  mobility  has  become  a  highly  desirable  network  feature  nowadays, 
especially in wireless networks (e.g. cellular networks [1-3]). This technology enables users to access 
services universally and without geographical limitations. In other words, they can go outside the 
coverage zone of their home networks, travel to foreign networks and access services provided by 
the latter as a visiting user or a guest. This capability is usually called roaming. Security is one of the 
major  requirement  in  roaming  networks.  In  addition  to  authentication,  user’s  privacy  is  equally 
important in such networks. To preserve this feature, not only should the user’s identity be protected 
(anonymity requirement), but also his location and the relation between his activities should be kept 
secret (untraceability requirement). The violation of either of the mentioned requisites can seriously 
endanger  the  user’s  privacy.  Samfat  et  al.  [1]  have  proposed  a  comprehensive  classification  for 
different levels of privacy protection according to the knowledge of different entities about the user’s 
identification information. The classification is as follows:  
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  C1: Each user is anonymous to eavesdroppers and his activities are unlinkable to them.  
  C2:  In  addition  to  C1,  each  user  is  anonymous to the foreign servers and his activities are 
unlinkable to them.  
  C3: In addition to C2, the relationship between the user and servers (the home server and the 
foreign servers) is anonymous for eavesdroppers.  
  C4: In addition to C3, the home server of the user is anonymous to the foreign servers.  
  C5: In addition to C4, each user is anonymous and his activities are unlinkable to his home 
server.  
In the standard universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS) [2], the home server 
must be always aware of the mobile user’s location in order to route the incoming calls towards the 
user. Moreover, the foreign server should know the identity of the home server for billing purpose. 
Therefore, it seems that the admissible level of privacy protection in this scenario is C3. In the last 
decades, several schemes addressed the privacy of users in mobile networks [3-15]. However, the 
most  perfect  and  practical  scheme  that  has  been  proposed  so  far  only  achieves  the C2 class of 
anonymity and the possible C3 class has not been provided in UMTS yet. To fill this blank, Fatemi et 
al. [2] recently proposed a privacy-preserving roaming protocol based on hierarchical identity-based 
encryption (IBE) [16] for mobile networks. This protocol was claimed to achieve the acceptable C3 
level of privacy. In this communication, we first show that it has some security weakness and thus 
the claimed security level is not achieved. Finally, we propose an enhanced protocol to remedy the 
existing security loopholes.  
 
PRELIMINARY 
 
In this section we recall the concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and hierarchical IBE 
(HIBE) schemes, upon which Fatemi et al.’s scheme builds. Here we just follow their description [2]. 
At first, we introduce the concept of a bilinear map between two groups, which will be used in the 
IBE scheme. Let  1 G  be an additive group and  2 G  be a multiplicative group, both of order q  (q 
should  be  some large prime, e.g. 160 bits). We say that a map  1 1 2 e G G G     is an admissible 
bilinear map if all the three following conditions are satisfied: 
1)  ( ) ( )
ab e aP bQ e P Q     for all  q a b Z    and  1 P Q G    (bilinear condition);  
2)  the map does not send all elements of  1 1 G G   to the identity element of  2 G  (non-degeneracy 
condition); and 
3)  there is an efficient algorithm to compute  ( ) e P Q   for all  1 P Q G    (computability condition).  
Throughout  this  communication,  the  Bilinear  Diffie-Hellman  (BDH)  in  1 2 G G e      is 
believed  to  be  hard  (i.e.  it  is  hard  to  compute  2 ( )
abc e P P G   ,  given  P aP bP cP      for  some 
q a b c Z    ). Since the BDH problem is not harder than the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) 
problem in  1 G  or  2 G , the CDH problem in  1 G  or  2 G  is also believed to be hard. The CDH problem 
in  1 G  is as follows: given random  P aP bP      for  q a b Z   , compute abP; the CDH problem in 
2 G  is  defined  similarly.  In  addition,  for  a  point  1 Q G
  ,  the  isomorphism  1 2 Q f G G    by 
( ) ( ) Q f P e P Q    is considered as a one-way function (P  cannot be inferred from  ( ) e P Q   and Q)  
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since an efficient algorithm for inverting  Q f  for some Q results in an efficient algorithm for solving 
CDH problem in  2 G .  
Now we begin to introduce the IBE system. An IBE is a public key cryptosystem in which 
the public key takes any arbitrary string such as a name or an e-mail address, and the private key 
generator (PKG) can produce a private key corresponding to each string. Hence, one can encrypt a 
message by a public key even if the public key’s owner has not yet set up his private key. An efficient 
IBE is presented [17], which is called a Boneh-Franklin scheme. Let P  be a generator of  1 G  and 
q s Z
   be the PKG’s master key. Then in the Boneh-Franklin scheme, each user’s identity-based 
private key should be computed as  1( ) U k sH U  , where  1 1 {0 1} H G
     is a cryptographic hash 
function and U  is the user’s identity. Then one can encrypt a message using the public key U , and 
U  can decrypt the ciphertext using the private key  U k . The BF scheme is resistant to the chosen 
ciphertext attack, assuming the hardness of the BDH problem [17].  
Similar to the public key cryptosystems, a hierarchy of PKGs is desirable in an IBE system to 
reduce the workload of the master servers. A two-level HIBE (2-HIBE) is presented [16]. There are 
three entities involved in a 2-HIBE scheme: a root PKG which possesses a master key s , the domain 
PKGs which gain their domain keys from the root PKG, and the users with private keys generated by 
their domain PKGs. The 2-HIBE scheme benefits from a linear one-way function  1 1 q h G Z G
     
with the following properties:  
1)  For all  1 ( ) ( ) q P G a x Z h aP x ah P x
         ,  
2)  Given  1 i q x x Z P G
      and  ( ) i i x h aP x      for  1 i n     ,  ( ) h aP x   cannot be computed with 
any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm.  
   The function h defined above is a one-way function with respect to its first argument, i.e. P  
cannot be inferred from  ( ) h P x   and  x. Then the key for domain S  is  1 1 ( ) S k sH S G    and the key 
for  user U  in  domain  S  is  2 1 ( ( )) U S k h k H S U G      ,  where  2 {0 1} q H Z
      is a cryptographic 
hash  function  and   denotes  concatenation.  Finally,  one  can  encrypt  a  message  by  a  public  key 
S U    and U  can decrypt the ciphertext using  U k . 
 
FATEMI ET AL.’ S ROAMING PROTOCOL 
  
Review of Protocol   
Here we just follow the description of Fatemi et al [2]. Like Wan et al.’s scheme [18], they 
also assume that a 2-HIBE is implemented in the system and the domain servers have received their 
private keys  1 { ( )}
i S i K sH S   from a root server. Also, they suppose that the user U  obtains his 
private  key  2 ( ( )) U HS K h K H HS U      during  the  registration at his home domain server  HS . In 
addition, a temporary key 1 2 ( ( ( ( ) ( )) K e h h H HS H HS Nym      2 1 ( )) ( )) H HS sH HS   corresponding to 
a pseudonym  Nym will be computed by the user during the roaming protocol and will be used for 
the authentication and key agreement purposes when he enters a foreign network domain.  
As shown in Figure 1, the protocol is as follows:   
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Step 1.   When the foreign server (FS ) detects a new user in his domain, it generates a nonce  s N  and 
a random number  s r  (both from  q Z
) and computes  s r P. Then it stores the values  s N  and  s r P in 
his database and sends the first message including his identity  FS s ID N   and  s r P to the user.  
 
 
Figure. 1. Fatemi et al.’s roaming protocol [2] 
 
Step 2.   Similarly,  the  user  U  generates  a  nonce  u N  and  a  random  number  u r  and  computes 
u u s r r P k   . Then he fetches the only unused pair of ( ) Nym K   from his memory and computes 
the session key to be shared with the foreign server as  4( 1) u u u s sk H K FS Nym N N k                
and  a  verifier  4( u u u mac H K FS Nym N k              0) s N   , where  4 H  is a hash function which 
maps 
* {0 1}   to {0 1}
l   for some security parameter l. After that, he selects an arbitrary  next Nym  to 
be used in the next execution of the roaming protocol (either in the  current FS  or another FS ). 
In order to compute the corresponding key  next K  with the help of FS  and HS , the user selects a 
random  number  q a Z
    and  computes  the  following  values: 
1 1 2 2 ( ( ( ) ( )) ( )) next x h h a H HS H HS Nym H HS
       ,      2 1 2 2 ( ( ( ) ( )) ( )) x h h a H HS H HS U H HS
       . 
Also,  he  chooses  random  numbers  1 2 q b a a Z
     and  computes  1 1 2 2 a x a x
    and 
( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID     , where  ( ) S E M  denotes the ID-based encryption of message M  with 
the public key S (e.g. HS  or FS ), and  ( ) U E K U   denotes the symmetric encryption of U  with 
the key  U K . Next, he sends the values  1 1 1 ( ) FS HS u u s s u E Nym ID N r P N r P mac x a x
          2 2 a x
  and 
( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      to the foreign server.  
Step 3.   Upon  receiving  the  above  values,  the  foreign  server  checks  if  s N  and  s r P  exist  in  its 
database  and  aborts  the  connection  if  it  does  not  find  such  values.  Otherwise,  it  decrypts 
( ) FS HS E Nym ID   with  its  private  key  1( ) sH FS  and  obtains  the  Nym  and  HS ID .  Then  it 
generates a random number  q c Z
   and computes  1 2 2 ( ( ( ) ( )) ( )) z h h cH HS H HS Nym H HS      . 
Subsequently, the FS  sends  z  and  ( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      to the HS .   
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Step 4.   The  home  server  decrypts  the  message  ( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      with  its  private  key 
1( ) sH HS  and checks whether it has received the messages from the server with the identity 
FS ID . Then it authenticates the user U  by verifying the correctness of  ( ) U E K U  . The home 
server  terminates  the  connection  if  any  of  these  verifications  fails.  Otherwise,  it  computes 
1 ( ( )) y e z sH HS   1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) s b H HS sH HS     1( ) bH HS    and sends them back to the FS .  
Step 5.   The  FS  computes  s s u r r P k    and  the  values 
1 c K y
   ,  4( s u mac H K FS Nym k
            
0) u N Ns     .  The  FS  rejects  the  connection  if  the  equality  u u mac mac
   does  not  hold. 
Otherwise, it accepts K
 as the user’s key corresponding to Nym and authenticates the user. 
The  computed  K
  together  with  the  message  ( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      are  credentials  by 
which  the  foreign  server  will  be  able  to  request  the  user’s  home  server  for  service  charge. 
Indeed, these values become a proof for payment request. In the next step the foreign server 
computes  the  session  key  4( 1) s s u sk H K FS Nym N Ns k
                and  the  authenticator 
4( s s mac H K k
          2) u FS Nym N Ns         .  Moreover,  the  foreign  server  calculates 
1 1 1 ( ( ) ( )) y e x s b H HS
     and  2 1 1 2 2 1 ( ( ) ( )) y e a x a x s b H HS
       to  make  the  computation  of 
next K  feasible for the user. Finally, it returns  1 s mac y   and  4 2 ( ) H y  to the user.  
Step 6.   When  the  user  receives  the  messages  from  the  foreign  server,  he  computes 
4( 2) U s u mac H K FS Nym N Ns k
                and  checks  the  equality  s s mac mac
  .  If  it             
does not hold, the user aborts the connection.   Otherwise, he authenticates the  foreign  server 
and  computes  the  following  values: 1 1 1 1 ( ( )) y y e x bH HS
     , 
1
2 1 2 1 2 ( ) [ ( ( ( )) ( )) (
a
U y y e h a K H HS H HS e x
      
2
1( ))]
a bH HS  ,
1 ( )
1 ( )
a
next K y
    .  Afterwards,  the 
user  considers  whether 4 2 4 2 ( ) ( ) H y H y
  .  If  the  equation  holds,  he  accepts  next K  as  the  key 
corresponding to  next Nym . If not, he rejects the connection.  
At the end of the protocol,  u s sk sk   is the key that the user and the home server have agreed 
upon to be used for security purpose. 
 
Weakness of Fatemi et al.’s Protocol   
We  assume  the  adversary  has  totally  controlled  a  mobile  user U  or  equivalently  he  has 
revealed the secret keys 
U K  through side channel attacks [19]. We further assume the adversary has 
corrupted  one  of foreign networks, e.g.  FN . Let  HS  be the home server of U  and  FS  be the 
server of FN . The adversary impersonated U  to visit FN  and initiated an execution of Fatemi et 
al.’s roaming protocol. He obtained from the corrupted network the message transmitted from HA 
to  FS  in  Step  4:  1 ( ) ( ) s b H HS  ,  where  b  is  the  random  number  chosen  by  the  adversary               
in  Step  2.  He    could    then    compute  HS ’s    secret    key 
HS K    through 
1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
HS K sH HS s b H HS bH HS     .  When  the  adversary  knows 
HS K ,  the  problem  of 
Fatemi et al.’s roaming protocol becomes evident:  
  Firstly, the adversary can reveal the real identity of any other subscriber of HS . When a mobile 
user U ( U  )  performs  the  authentication  procedure  with  a foreign server  FS  ( FS  ), the 
adversary eavesdrops their communication and can easily get the message transmitted between  
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U  and  FS  :  FS ID  in Step 1 and  ( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID     in Step 2. Then the adversary just  
guesses  that  U  is  a  subscriber  of  HS  and  attempts  to  decrypt  the  message 
( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      with  1( )
HS K sH HS  .  If  he  can  retrieve  FS ID  from  the  decrypted 
message, he confirms his guess is correct, i.e. HS HS  , because otherwise the probability that 
he gets any meaningful results from decryption for verification is next to zero. Then he further 
retrieves item U  from the decrypted message and thus knows the user’s real identity  U . This 
even contradicts the C1 security requirements. However, if U  is not a subscriber of HS , his 
attack cannot succeed, but he will always succeed for any subscriber of HS .  
  Secondly, the adversary can impersonate any other subscriber of HS  (e.g. U ) because he may 
derive  U K  from 
HS K  as follows:  2 ( ( )) U HS K h K H HS U     .  In other words, the authentication 
mechanism of the protocol is completely compromised.   
 
IMPROVED ROAMING PROTOCOL 
 
The above demonstrated attacks show that Fatemi et al.’s protocol does not seem to achieve 
authentication or anonymity. In this section we present an enhanced protocol to remedy the security 
loopholes.  As  shown  in  Figure  2,  our  protocol  is  based  on  that of Fatemi et al. and it has the 
following changes:  
 
 
Figure 2.  Improved roaming protocol 
 
  In Step 2 the computation of  1 1 2 2 a x a x
    is not needed any longer and finally the user U  sends 
the  values  1 ( ) FS HS u u s s u E Nym ID N r P N r P mac x
         and  ( ( ) ) HS FS E b U E KU U ID      to  the 
foreign server.  
  In Step 3  the  FS also forwards   1 x
  to the HS.  That is, the FS  sends z, 
( ( ) ) HS U FS E b U E K U ID      and  1 x
 to the HS.   
Maejo Int. J. Sci. Technol.  2012, 6(01), 62-69   
 
 
68
  In Step 4 the computation of  1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) s b H HS sH HS bH HS     is not needed. Instead, the 
home server computes a new item  1 1 1 ( ( ( )) ) U w E K e x sH HS x
        to make the computation of 
next K  feasible for the user and finally sends w along with  y  back to the FS .  
  In Step 5 the computation of  1 y  and  2 y  is not needed and the foreign server returns  s mac  and 
w to the user.  
  In Step 6 the computation of  1 y
 and  2 y
 is not needed. After the verification of  s mac  is passed 
and the foreign server is authenticated, the user U  decrypts w using his own secret key  U K  to 
retrieve the two items  1 1 1 ( ( )) e x sH HS x
     . If the decrypted  1 x
 is the same as  1 x
 computed in 
Step  1,  he  proceeds  to  compute 
1 ( )
1 1 ( ( ( )))
a
next K e x sH HS
      and  accepts  next K  as  the  key 
corresponding to  next Nym . If not, he rejects the connection. 
In our improved protocol, the item  1 1 ( ( )) e x sH HS
  is used to make the computation of  next K  
feasible for the user. Given  1 1 ( ( )) e x sH HS
 , it is impossible for the adversary to compute  1( ) sH HS  
since  the  isomorphism  Q f (here  1 Q x
  )  is  a  one-way  function.  Therefore,  the  attacks  described 
previously will not work any more. Although the changes introduce some computation overhead on 
the side of  HS  due to the computation of  w , the computation cost of  FS  or U  is significantly 
reduced  since  both  FS  and  U  omit  several  costly  operations  (including  bilinear  map  and 
exponentiation). In practice the device of the mobile user is much less powerful than the servers’. 
Our protocol, therefore, would be more practical. 
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